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WITNESSES ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL INTRUSION UPON
THE PRACTICES OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESS PARENTS
JULIE A. KOEHNE
I. INTRODUCTION
R ELIGION is at the heart of many basic attitudes and values. Rec-
ognizing this, the United States Constitution guarantees that
American citizens shall be free to pursue their chosen religion.' Addi-
tionally, in Florida, there is a fundamental right of privacy in article I,
section 23 of the state constitution, which appears to further
strengthen a citizen's right to adhere to his or her preferred faith.'
This section provides "an explicit textual foundation for those privacy
interests inherent in the concept of liberty," 3 of which religion is an
integral part. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that "the
term '[p]rivacy' has been used interchangeably with the common un-
derstanding of the notion of 'liberty,' and both imply a fundamental
right of self-determination subject only to the state's compelling and
overriding interests." ' 4 This qualification indicates that free exercise
rights are not unlimited. Courts have often drawn a distinction be-
tween the right to hold religious beliefs and the right to act upon
them. The United States Supreme Court first expressed this belief-ac-
tion dichotomy in Reynolds v. United States.5 In Reynolds, the Court
affirmed a Mormon's conviction for polygamy despite his contention
that his actions were compelled by religious beliefs. 6 The Court rea-
soned that "[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices." 7
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 434 (Ala. Civ. App.),
cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1977).
2. Article I, section 23 provides, inter alia, that "[e]vcry natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life .... " FLA. CONST. art. I, §
23.
3. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
4. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990).
5. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6. Id. at 166-67.
7. Id. at 166. This doctrine is still utilized today. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
702 (1986)(holding that the statutory requirement that applicants obtain and provide a Social
Security number as a condition for receiving food stamps and welfare benefits does not violate
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Courts have often recognized the belief-action dichotomy in cases
involving children. For example, in Kirchner v. Caughey,8 the Mary-
land Court of Appeal held that:
When the welfare of a child is threatened . . . the task of
[governmental] intervention cannot be avoided, and under some
circumstances actions based upon the sincerely held religious beliefs
of one parent or both parents must give way to the safety and
welfare of the child. When the life or physical safety of a child is
threatened, a tenuous balancing between religious freedoms and the
exercise of state authority is necessarily made. As the threat to the
child diminishes, this balancing of interests becomes more difficult.9
Religion and the numerous practices dictated or motivated by religion
permeate issues concerning the welfare of children and their upbring-
ing by religious parents. Religious beliefs held by some parents may
appear unusual or foreign to many others outside of that religion. In-
deed, numerous cases regarding the impact of a parent's religion on a
child have involved Jehovah's Witnesses. The courts and much of the
general population have found it difficult to accept or ignore the relig-
ious practices of Jehovah's Witnesses, even when the effect of such
practices on Jehovah's Witnesses' children is too speculative or insuf-
ficient to allow an impairment of religious freedom by the courts.' 0
Although there are many issues surrounding the Jehovah's Witness
faith, the scope of this article will be limited to a discussion of the
judicial interference Jehovah's Witnesses face in maintaining their re-
ligious objections to blood transfusions and in exercising their right to
raise their children in the faith. This Comment will first set forth some
basic tenets of the Jehovah's Witness faith. Second, it will examine
how courts treat adult Witnesses when they refuse blood transfusions
for themselves as well as how courts evaluate their status as parents in
determining whether a transfusion should be ordered. Third, this
Comment will look at how courts evaluate a parent's status as a Jeho-
the Free Exercise Clause. The Court found that the Clause affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion, but does not afford an individual a right to dictate
the conduct of the Government's internal procedures); see also Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541
go. 2d 96, 105 (Fla. 1989)(Overton, J., dissenting)("Although the right to religious beliefs is
absolute, the manner in which those beliefs are conducted may clearly be restricted by govern-
mental action, motivated by legitimate governmental interests, such as those concerning minor
children .... ").
8. 606 A.2d 257 (Md. 1992).
9. Id. at 261.
10. See Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R.
4th 971 (1983)(summarizing cases involving child custody disputes where one parent is a Jeho-
vah's Witness).
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vah's Witness when settling child custody disputes. Finally, this Com-
ment will propose several guidelines for future decisions involving
Jehovah's Witnesses, concluding that they should be able to adhere to
the principles of their chosen faith and raise their children accordingly
without interference from courts, which appear to view Witnesses
with skepticism.
II. TENETS OF THE FAITH
Since 1876, Jehovah's Witnesses have believed that they are living
in the "last days," which will culminate in the Battle of Armageddon,
when Christ will return to set up his earthly kingdom." Jehovah's
Witnesses typically refuse blood transfusions based upon what they
believe to be the Bible's prohibition against "eating blood.' 2 Wit-
nesses reason that because a blood transfusion is an intravenous feed-
ing, it is identical to "eating blood,"' 3 a practice they strongly believe
the Bible forbids.'4 Other beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses include:
a) One should not salute the flag;
b) Birthdays, Christmas and national holidays should not be
celebrated;
c) All governments are under the control of Satan;
d) All other religions are false religions;
e) All governments and false religions stand in the way of world
peace;
f) All military bodies are instruments of the devil; and
11. M. JAMES PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE STORY OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES (1985).
Many members of the faith believe that only Witnesses will be spared from the holocaust that
will occur at Armageddon. See Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. 1978); Clift v. Clift,
346 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1977).
12. John C. Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CAm. LAW.
212 (1964).
13. Id. at 212 n. 11.
14. See Genesis 9:4 ("But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not
eat"); Leviticus 3:17 ("By a perpetual law for your generation, and all your habitations, neither
blood not fat shall you eat at all"); Acts 15:29 ("That you abstain from things sacrificed to
idols, and blood"). Jehovah's Witnesses reject the argument that these passages are dietary laws,
and discuss their opposition to blood transfusions in their religious publications. For example:
Is It Cannibalism?
Today people in "civilized" lands shudder in horror at reports of cannibals drinking
human blood in various parts of the world, but they take it as altogether different for
themselves to receive transfusions of human blood into their physical systems ....
His [Jesus Christ's] followers get the benefit of his shed blood, not by a blood trans-
fusion, but by exercising faith in the value of his blood.
See Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, Life Everlasting In Freedom of the
Sons of God 337-39 (1966), quoted in Judith M. Nyhus Johnson, Minnesota's "Crack Baby"
Law: Weapon of War or Link in a Chain?, 8 LAW & INEQ. J. 485, 501 n.84 (1989).
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g) No life-threatening physical force should ever be used."
Additionally, members are strongly counseled against allowing their
children to participate in sports or other extracurricular activities with
people outside of the congregation, including organizations such as
Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts.16 Jehovah's Witnesses also are taught that
higher education is only for purely vocational purposes; that there is
only one true holiday, that being the memorial of the death of Christ;
and that patriotism is divisive. 7 These are some of the fundamental
tenets of the Jehovah's Witness faith and the ones most likely to be
raised against them in a legal battle.
IlI. THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESS PATIENTS' RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE RECEIPT OF BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
Although the state clearly has a substantial interest in preserving the
life of its citizens, that interest is not an unswerving mandate."' This
limitation follows from the fundamental premise that everyone has
the inherent right to control their own person.19 An integral part of
this individual autonomy is "the right to make choices pertaining to
one's health, including the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment." 20 This right of refusal encompasses all medical choices.2 1 A
competent individual has a constitutionally protected right to refuse
medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condition.2 2 Courts
15. Waites, 567 S.W.2d at 328-29. In the past, Jehovah's Witnesses have been involved in
notable court cases to defend their religious beliefs and practices. See West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)(Jehovah's Witnesses objecting on religious grounds to a
requirement that their children salute the flag in public school); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977)(Jehovah's Witnesses objecting on religious grounds to required display of phrase
"Live Free or Die" on New Hampshire license plate).
16. Hornung v. Hornung, 485 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992)(citing Ledoux v.
Ledoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990)).
17. Id.
18. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
19. See In re Guardianship of Browning 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)("Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his ... own
body." (citing Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914))).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id. Traditionally, the law has preserved a patient's right to self-determination, even in
life or death situations. See In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1177 (111. App. Ct. 1992). Courts have
long recognized the right of a patient to determine what medical procedures they will undergo.
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990); Schloendorff, 105
N.E. at 93.
22. See Public Health Trust v. Worts, 541 So. 2d 96, 97-8 (Fla. 1989); see also Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 279 ("IF]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition."). Furthermore, a competent adult patient, who is suffering from a terminal illness
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have generally regarded the subjective desires of competent adults to
forego medical treatment as dispositive.23 As previously noted, how-
ever, an individual's express religion-based wishes may be strictly eval-
uated and sometimes overridden if the court is concerned about the
welfare of innocent third parties, such as minor or unborn children. 24
A. Prevented from Keeping the Faith in Florida: Jehovah's
Witnesses Being Transfused Against Their Will
Members of the Jehovah's Witness faith have endured numerous
intrusions by the Florida judicial system in their struggle to refuse
blood transfusions on religious grounds. In Wons v. Public Health
Trust,2 5 a married Jehovah's Witness woman with three children was
admitted to the hospital with a uterine condition from which she
would have likely died without a blood transfusion. 26 Wons refused
the transfusion on the grounds that it violated her religious principle
against receiving blood from outside her body.27 When Wons refused
to give consent, she was conscious and, according to her doctor, able
to make an informed decision. 28 Wons' husband supported her deci-
sion, and was prepared, in the event of her death, to care for their
children with the assistance of other family members .29 Nonetheless,
and has no minor dependents, has a constitutionally protected right to refuse or discontinue
extraordinary medical treatment where all affected family members consent. Satz v. Perlmutter,
379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980). The landmark case concerning the right to refuse medical treat-
ment is In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). There is a difference, however, between asserting a right to die, as in In re
Quinlan, and refusing life saving medical treatment, as in the case of In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322
(11. 1989), where death was not a desired outcome, but rather a consequence. The issue pre-
sented in In re E.G. was whether a mature minor, approaching her eighteenth birthday, had a
constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. Id. at 324. For a detailed
description and analysis of this case, see William D. Brewster, Note, In re E.G., a Minor: Death
Over Life: A Judicial Trend Continues as the Illinois Supreme Court Grants Minors the Right to
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment, 23 J. MAmSHALL L. REv. 771 (1990).
23. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 11 ("[A) competent person has the constitutional right to chose
or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant decisions concerning one's
health."). The Florida Supreme Court found no reason to qualify this right based on the type of
treatment being refused by the patient. Id. at II n.6.
24. See In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), con-
cerning a pregnant patient's refusal to consent to a blood transfusion based on her religious
beliefs. The patient, whose condition was critical from loss of blood, was eighteen weeks preg-
nant and the mother of ten children. Id. at 899. Her only next-of-kin, a sister, could not be
contacted. Id. In authorizing the transfusion, the judge based his decision primarily on the
state's interest in protecting the welfare of the fetus and the woman's minor children. Id. at 900.
25. 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
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the circuit court granted the Health Trust's petition to force Wons to
undergo a blood transfusion while she was unconscious.30 When Wons
regained consciousness after the transfusion, she appealed to the
Third District Court of Appeal, which reversed the order.3 After
holding that the issue was not moot, as Wons' condition might recur,
the district court held that Wons' constitutional rights of freedom of
religion and privacy could not be overridden by the state's purported
interests32
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, 3
and in so doing adhered to the terms of their decision in Satz v. Peri-
mutter.3 4 In Satz, the court adopted four criteria established by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal for determining when the right to
refuse medical treatment may be overridden by a compelling state in-
terest. 5 These factors are:
1) preservation of life;
2) protection of innocent third parties;
3) prevention of suicide; and
4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 36
The Wons court evaluated these factors in light of the competing in-
terests of Wons' fundamental right to practice her religion, her consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy, 37 and the state's substantial
30. Id. The circuit judge reasoned as follows:
I'm going to now take judicial notice of another fact which has not been expressed.
I'll take judicial notice of the fact that, in my opinion, the two children here, one 12
and one 14, would be denied an intangible right they have to be reared by two loving
parents, and not one, and I'll take judicial notice of the fact that for the most part the
love and the parentage of two parents is far better than one, and that we would end up
therefore with better citizens.
I recognize the law, and I know what the law says. You have a competent adult. She
has refused to take blood and she has a right to do so. The only way that we can
obviate that right that's guaranteed to her by the privacy of the right of the Constitu-
tion of this state is to find an overriding interest, or overriding reason. I'm going to
tell you straight out, and it may not be a popular decision, but I think that the right of
these two children to be reared by two parents is an overriding reason.
Wons, 500 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Thus, the circuit judge appeared to base his
ruling on personal distaste for both Wons' decision and the religion which mandated it.
31. Id. at 679.
32. Id. at 683.
33. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 96.
34. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
35. Id.
36. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). In Wons, the Florida
Supreme Court was careful to point out that the Satz factors are not a bright-line test, but rather
mere evaluative criteria. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97. For another example of how the Satz factors
have been applied, see St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
37. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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interest in maintaining both Wons' life and protecting innocent third
parties, in this case her children, aged twelve and fourteen. 38 In mak-
ing its determination, the court stated that "[wihile . . . the nurturing
and support by two parents is important in the development of any
child, it is not sufficient to override fundamental constitutional
rights," 3 9 and found that "the state's interest in maintaining a home
with two parents for the minor children does not override Wons' con-
stitutional rights of privacy and religion.' ,4
Despite the Wons decision, in situations where an individual has not
clearly expressed his or her belief against blood transfusions and the
individual's family refuses to consent, judges often will authorize an
emergency blood transfusion based on the state's interest in preserving
life. For example, in In re Dubreuil,41 Patricia Dubreuil, a Jehovah's
Witness, was admitted to the hospital for an emergency cesarean sec-
tion.42 Dubreuil had a severe condition that prevented her blood from
clotting, and transfusions were required to save her life during the sur-
gical procedure a.4  At the time of the emergency, Dubreuil was sepa-
rated from her husband, who was not a Jehovah's Witness and who
did not accompany his wife to the hospital."4 In addition to the new-
born baby, the Dubreuils had three other children, aged twelve, six,
and four. 45 Dubreuil, her mother, and a spiritual advisor from the
church were strongly opposed to any blood transfusions.4 Given this
38. Wonts, 541 So. 2d at 96.
39. Id. at 97.
40. Id. at 98. In so holding, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the district court's logic
and restated its reasoning for overturning the order:
Central [to cases such as this] is a delicate balancing analysis in which the courts
weigh, on the one hand, the patient's constitutional right of privacy and right to prac-
tice one's religion, as against certain basic societal interests. Obviously, there are no
preordained answers to such problematic questions and the results reached in these
cases are highly debatable. Running through all of these decisions, however, is the
courts' deeply imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an indi-
vidual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to lead his private life
according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable governmental interference. Surely
nothing, in the last analysis, is more private or more sacred than one's religion or view
of life, and here the courts, quite properly, have given great deference to the indivi-
dual's right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life according to his own
conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is, without exaggeration, the
very bedrock on which this country was founded.
Id. (quoting Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 687-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)).
41. 603 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), cert. granted, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1993).
42. Id. at 539.
43. Id.
44. Id. When contacted, Mr. Dubreuil signed the consent forms for the transfusions. Id.
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opposition, the hospital petitioned the circuit court for an emergency
declaratory judgment authorizing it to perform the necessary transfu-
sions.47 The court granted the hospital's request, and Dubreuil was
immediately given a blood transfusion. 4
What appears to distinguish Dubreuil from Wons is that neither
Dubreuil, her estranged husband, nor her mother offered any testi-
mony regarding what would become of the minor children upon Du-
breuil's imminent death.49 Without a satisfactory demonstration that
the children would be adequately cared for, the court found that the
state's interests in preserving the welfare of innocent third parties -
here the four minor children - outweighed Dubreuil's desire to con-
trol the course of her medical treatment. 0 This case is currently on
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court."
B. Judicial Determinations of When, if Ever, a Blood Transfusion
to an Adult Jehovah's Witness Should Be Required
The underlying problem in most cases involving Jehovah's Wit-
nesses is that "[n]o blanket rule is feasible which could sufficiently
cover all occasions in which this situation will arise.' '52 Thus, hospitals
that wish to contest a patient's refusal of treatment will have "to com-
mence court proceedings and sustain the heavy burden of proof that
the state's interest outweighs the patient's constitutional
rights ...... -1 By the same token, hospitalized Jehovah's Witnesses
47. Id.
48. Id. at 540.
49. Id. at 540-41. The court in Dubreuil did not interpret Wons as placing an insurmounta-
ble burden of proof in the way of the court's ability to exercise its discretion in overriding the
wishes of a devoutly religious individual, especially in an emergency situation. Id. at 541.
50. Id.
51. In re Dubrcuil, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1993). The court should take this opportunity to
decisively state whether a Jehovah's Witness parent can lawfully refuse blood transfusions re-
gardless of whether the parent can demonstrate that their minor children will be cared for in the
event the parent dies. A case similar to Dubreui, in that it was an emergency proceeding, is St.
Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In that case, a circuit judge
upheld a patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion even thought the patient might have died
within a few hours without it. Id. at 667. The patient, a Jehovah's Witness, was twenty-seven
years old, had kidney disease, and believed that ingestion of whole blood products would deny
him both resurrection and eternal salvation. Id. at 668. The decision was affirmed by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Id. at 669. See aLso In re Estate of Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985), aff'd, 534 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987); University of Cincinnati Hosp. v. Edmond, 506
N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Com. P1. 1986). In both Dorone and Edmond, Jehovah's Witnesses arrived at
the hospital unable to express their objections to receiving blood transfusions. The courts in both
cases declined to honor the individuals' beliefs, as expressed by their families, based on the
state's overriding concern in preserving life.
52. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989).
53. Id.
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cannot be certain that their wishes will be followed in the event they
lose consciousness or approach death. Moreover, the chance that they
will receive blood transfusions against their will increases significantly
if they are parents of minor children. Such a result is unacceptable.
All patients of sound mind should have the freedom to refuse unde-
sired medical treatment, regardless of their reasons for doing so.' 4
Courts should not evaluate what constitutes a justifiable reason for
refusing treatment. That determination must be left to the individual.
It is, no doubt, a truism that the doctrine of parens patriael5 prop-
erly seeks to prevent the abandonment of minor children . 6 Courts,
however, should not use this doctrine to override the wishes of a de-
voutly religious parent whose decision to refuse medical treatment is
potentially life-threatening. Additionally, courts should not underesti-
mate the value to children of knowing their parent stands behind his
or her religious or moral convictions, even when such action might
result in death . 7 What is most disturbing about these cases is that trial
court judges appear to base their opinions upon their own personal
dislike of the Jehovah's Witnesses' decision to refuse life-saving medi-
cal treatment.58 This type of bias must be eliminated, and the patient's
will regarding his or her own body should be respected.
The courts' readiness to impose blood transfusions upon Jehovah's
Witness parents against their will in order to ostensibly further the
best interests of their children is not the only judicial intrusion Wit-
nesses are forced to endure. These parents are often required to vigor-
ously defend their faith in court in order to maintain custody of their
children and raise them according to their chosen religion."
IV. THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESS PARENTS' UPHILL CLIMB TO GAIN
CUSTODY OF THEIR CHILDREN AND RAISE THEM IN THE FAITH
As a general principle, parents have the freedom to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit. This freedom includes the right to educate and
54. Clearly, in cases involving patients who are suicidal or otherwise mentally ill, steps of-
ten must be taken to ensure the individual's safety and the safety of others around them, even if
the patient resists treatment or assistance, However, a distinction must be drawn between these
types of situations and ones involving the deliberate, conscious exercise of an adult individual's
religious or other deeply-held beliefs.
55. This principle holds that the state must care for those who cannot properly care for
themselves, such as minors or the insane. BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
56. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (stressing the importance that there
would be no abandonment since other members of the family were available to care for the
children in the event of Mrs. Wons' death).
57. Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), aff'd, 541 So.
2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
58. See e.g., id. at 679.
59. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
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expose children to religion in accordance with the parents' own be-
liefsA0 The hesitancy of courts to interfere with the free exercise rights
of families is exemplified in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 6' in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld the rights of Amish parents to keep their
children out of school in derogation of a state statute.62 The Court
accepted the Amish parents' contention that compelling school atten-
dance until their children reached age sixteen violated their free exer-
cise rights. 63 Thus, Yoder illustrates the limits of the doctrine of
parens patriae regarding the religious upbringing of children.
In custody disputes, however, the ability of a parent to direct the
child's religious upbringing appears to be abrogated because, ostensi-
bly, a court's paramount concern is for the best interests of the child,
rather than the rights of the parents." It has been judicially noted that
"[flew areas of dispute in child custody and visitation cases are more
fraught with difficulty than those involving differences in the religious
beliefs of the divorced parents.''65 Furthermore, these types of dis-
putes are exacerbated by the judiciary's lack of moral and legal au-
thority to prefer or choose one religion over another.6
When considering custody or visitation disputes, courts should re-
quire a clear showing that a parent's religious beliefs have been or are
likely to be harmful to the child before judicially interfering with
those religious practices. 67 At least one court has held that "[w]hen the
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the need for intervention, the
remedy should be that which intrudes least on the religious inclina-
tions of either parent and is yet compatible with the health of the
60. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); see also West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)(holding that parents have the right to ensure that
their children are not forced to violate their religion's tenets while at school); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)(affirming the parental right to direct the upbringing and
education of children).
61. 406U.S. at 205.
62. Id. at 234.
63. Id.
64. See Joslin v. Joslin, 274 P.2d 847, 851 (Wash. 1954).
65. Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D. 1987).
66. See Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 332 (Mo. 1978) ("We can not, under the system
of law which we are appointed to administer, look at that [and choose one religion over the
other). The state of which we are citizens and officers, does not regard herself as having any
competency in spiritual matters .... The law does not profess to know what is a right belief."
(quoting In re Laura Doyle, 16 Mo. App. 159, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1884))); see also id. ("The
state shall prefer no faith but must favor the best interests of those children whose parental
custody it determines.").
67. This is the legal standard that courts generally apply. See Kirchner v. Caughey, 606
A.2d 257, 261-62 (Md. 1992). However, in spite of the existence of this standard, Jehovah's
Witness parents are often subjected to intense and unjustified scrutiny in their attempts to gain
custody of their children. See text accompanying notes 62-87.
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child." 8 Such a remedy "should be narrowly tailor[ed] . . . so as to
result in the least possible intrusion upon the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the parent." 69
Accordingly, the majority of appellate courts that have reviewed
custody disputes between a Jehovah's Witness parent and a parent of
another faith have held that a court may not base its decision on
whether the custodial parent will allow the child to exhibit national
pride, participate in extracurricular activities, or celebrate holidays. 70
Unfortunately, this type of analysis is often precisely what transpires
at the trial court level, 7' as these courts are frequently influenced by
subjective considerations when determining custody issues. 72 Faith, es-
pecially that of Jehovah's Witnesses, seems to be constantly scruti-
nized by courts, and religious adherents are repeatedly compelled to
defend their beliefs. Even if Jehovah's Witness parents are ultimately
awarded custody of their children, they should not have to overcome
the apparent presumption at the lower court level that their children
will suffer by being in the custody of a member of the Witnesses. 73
A. Tracing the Uphill Climb
In the Florida case of Mendez v. Mendez,7 4 the father was desig-
nated as the primary residential parent in a custody dispute. The
mother appealed this award, and argued that the trial court based its
decision solely on the fact that she was a practicing Jehovah's Wit-
ness. 7 During the hearing, expert witnesses testified that there was "a
68. Kirchner, 606 A.2d at 262 (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Mass.
1981)).
69. Id. (quoting LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990)).
70. See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d
439 (Ala. 1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048
(1978); In re Deierling, 421 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); Waites v. Waites, 567
S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978). These courts reasoned that the tenets of the Jehovah's Witness
faith are not relevant in determining a parent's ability to care for their child, and that the United
States Constitution mandates that the courts do not examine a parent's religious beliefs unless
those beliefs result in practices that are detrimental to the best interests of the child.
71. See notes 62-87 and text accompanying.
72. This occurs in spite of appellate court decisions holding that courts should not adhere to
these unconstitutional practices. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); see also Waites, 567
S.W.2d at 326, 333 ("[N]o judicial officer may determine child custody based on approval or
disapproval of the beliefs, doctrine, or tenets of the religion of either parent or their interpreta-
tion thereof.").
73. See Clift, 346 So. 2d at 431 (after losing custody of her son at the trial level, the mother
contended on appeal that the court had impermissibly allowed introduction of testimony regard-
ing her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness).
74. 527 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
75. Id.
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very safe, a very lovable [sic], healthy attachment ' 76 between the child
and mother, but that the mother's religious beliefs were potentially
not in the best interests of the child, who would need "to adapt her-
self to the mainstream of culture." ' 77 The Third District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court's ruling, even though the mother testified
that she would be willing to comply with a court order permitting the
father to make all decisions regarding the child's religious education
and medical welfare. 78 The district court found that the record did not
support the mother's contentions 79 and that the trial court had based
its decision on the effect that the conflicting religious beliefs of the
parents had on the child.8 0 In his dissent, however, Judge Baskin
stated that the grant of custody to the father was an abuse of discre-
tion because all of the expert witnesses concurred that the child be-
longed with the mother.8 Judge Baskin warned that "[t]o be forced to
choose between one's religion and one's child is repugnant to a society
based on constitutional principles." 82
Jehovah's Witness parents have received similar treatment in other
states. For example, in the Ohio case of Pater v. Pater,8 3 the couple
filed for divorce and the father petitioned for custody of their son. 4
The child was three years old when the court awarded custody to the
father.8 5 At trial, there had been no dispute that both parents were
conscientious and loving.86 Instead, the primary issue was the effect
the mother's religious practices would have on the child.8 7 The mother
had recently become a Jehovah's Witness, and the father was Catho-
lic.88 Early in the hearing, the judge claimed that he "would not make
a decision based purely on the religeous [sic] aspects of this case.''89
However, on the second day of the hearing, the judge stated that the




80. Id. at 820. Both the trial court and the court of appeals apparently failed to consider the
possibility that the judge could have awarded custody to the mother and ordered the parents to
concur on the religious upbringing of the child. Apparently, the mother was amenable to this
arrangement. See also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
81. Mendez, 527 So. 2d at 820-22.
82. Id. at 824 (Baskin, J., dissenting, on motion for rehearing en banc and motion to cer-
tify question).
83. 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992).
84. Id. at 795-96.






issue was whether the mother would indoctrinate her child in her relig-
ion, and whether such indoctrination was "going to in some way ad-
versely affect the moral, mental, and physical health and judgement
of this child adversely, so as not to be in the child's best interests. "9o
Given this judicial cue, the father's counsel called the mother as a
hostile witness and questioned her extensively about whether Jeho-
vah's Witnesses celebrate holidays, associate with non-members, par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities and social organizations, salute the
flag, and sing the national anthem. 91
The father's counsel also called two expert witnesses to argue that
the child would be harmed if he were raised as a Jehovah's Witness. 92
One expert testified about his own experiences growing up as a Jeho-
vah's Witness, and concluded that mental illness occurs more fre-
quently among Jehovah's Witnesses than in the general population. 3
After the court awarded custody to the father, the mother requested
visitation. 94 At the visitation hearing, the judge told her that he would
not grant her visitation if she was going to teach the child her religion
or take the child to her church. 9 After being assured that the mother
would follow the court's instructions, the judge set a visitation sched-
ule which included the restriction that the mother "shall not teach or
expose the child to the Jehovah[']s Witnesses' beliefs in any form."96
The appellate court affirmed the domestic court's custody and visi-
tation orders, and found no abuse of discretion because "the child
would be less likely to receive proper medical attention, obtain a col-
lege education, or participate in social activities" if the mother were
granted custody. 97 On review, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed. 9 Al-
though the court agreed that a domestic relations court may consider
the religious practices of parents in order to protect the best interests
of a child, it also emphatically stated that to evaluate the merits of a
particular religious doctrine in a judicial proceeding is both improper




93. Id. One can argue, however, that incidents of mental illness of the religious in general
exceed that of the population in general, since adherence to any faith may generate feelings of
inadequacy, guilt, and unworthiness. Furthermore, attempting to live religiously in a society that
is becoming increasingly non-religious may also produce heightened anxiety.





99. Id. at 801.
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tody may not be denied to a parent solely because that parent "will
not encourage her child to salute the flag, celebrate holidays, or par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities."' 100
Another example of the uphill climb Jehovah's Witnesses face in
obtaining custody of their children is found in Waites v. Waites,'10 in
which the mother had been a Baptist but changed her faith to become
a Jehovah's Witness. 102 This religious conversion caused problems in
the marriage, including physical violence between the parties. 0 3 The
wife testified that if she retained custody of the couple's two children,
"she would encourage them to love and respect their father and would
do nothing to poison their minds against him."0 4 The wife further
testified that she would raise the children as Jehovah's Witnesses, 0 5
and stated that she would require them to attend Jehovah's Witness
meetings and functions until they were approximately sixteen years of
age."'6 The trial court awarded custody of the children to the father,'0 7
and the mother argued on appeal that the trial court decree contra-
vened her free exercise rights.1°8 The appellate court reversed and
awarded custody to the mother, finding that the trial court had imper-
missibly focused on the mother's religious beliefg.1' 9 The court went
on to state:
[w]e do not believe that the rights of parents to worship as they
please are at issue in a child custody dispute; what is rather
jeopardized by the expression of a judge's religious preference is the
right of each citizen that the state not make determinations of any
kind which respects, prefers, or favors one religious persuasion over
another, flowing from the "establishment" clause of the First
Amendment and article 1, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution. "0
The preceding cases illustrate that even if a Jehovah's Witness par-
ent is awarded custody of his or her children, it is often after a long,
100. Id.
101. 567 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1978).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 327.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id. at 330.
108. Id. at 331 n.2.
109. Id. at 326.
110. Id. at 331 n.2. Although neither of the children in this case were in need of a blood
transfusion, the court noted that if such a situation arose, and the parents were unable to agree
on what emergency medical action to take, then the juvenile court would have jurisdiction to
order a blood transfusion if necessary. Id. at 334.
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expensive, and arduous court battle. Arguably, such an ordeal is detri-
mental to the children's best interests, as it only serves to increase the
animosity between the divorcing parents and places additional stress
upon their children. The decisions referenced in the next section repre-
sent outcomes that appear to be less intrusive upon Jehovah's Witness
parents, and more desirable for all concerned.
B. An Even Playing Field for Parents and Their Respective
Religions
Some courts have sought to minimize the relevance of religious be-
liefs and differences in custody disputes between two equally fit par-
ents. In In re Deierling,"' the father, who had lost custody of his
children in a dissolution action, argued that he was better able to pro-
vide the children with a stable environment than was the mother who
had recently converted to Jehovah's Witnesses." 2 The parties' differ-
ing religious views had been a major stumbling block in the mar-
riage."1 The court reasoned that "an individual has the right to
choose his or her own religion, and parents together have the freedom
of religious expression and practice which enters into their liberty to
manage the familial relationships. ' "1 4 The court believed it "im-
proper" to label the mother unstable because she had chosen to be-
come a Jehovah's Witness.'"
Another example of a court honoring the mandates of the First
Amendment is Johnson v. Johnson.16 There, a husband and wife had
both been Jehovah's Witnesses, but the husband had been excommu-
nicated, or "disfellowshipped," from the congregation." 7 The wife re-
mained in the religion against the wishes of her husband."8 The
husband argued that if he was denied custody of the children, he
would have virtually no input in their lives because of his disfellow-
shipped status. l 9 Testimony was adduced at trial that since "a disfel-
lowshipped member of the Jehovah's Witnesses is believed to be
111. 421 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id. at 169.
113. Id. at 170.
114. Id. See also Deininger v. Deininger, 835 P.2d 449, 451 (Alaska 1992)(The Alaska Su-
preme Court praised the innovative award of shared physical custody to be implemented gradu-
ally over a two-year period in a case involving a mother who was a Jehovah's Witness and a
father who was not. The parents in this case demonstrated their ability to make joint decisions
regarding the children despite their religious differences).
115. Deierling, 421 N.W.2d at 170.
116. 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978).
117. Id. at 72.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 73.
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under, or in danger of coming under, satanic control, members of the
congregation will not associate with him."' 2 The husband opposed
the wife's plans to raise the children in strict accordance with the reli-
gion's rules, which he argued did not serve the children's best inter-
ests.' 2' The trial court, however, found that both parents were fit and
awarded physical custody to the mother.122 On appeal, the Alaska Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating that "certainly, we cannot use [the
mother's] continued membership in the Jehovah's Witnesses as a basis
for directing the trial court to award the children to [the father]. To
do so would be violative of her right to freedom of religion under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution .... 123
As the above cases illustrate, it is possible for courts deciding cases
involving the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to successfully further
the best interests of the children without subjecting the Witness par-
ents to unjustified and intrusive inquisitions regarding their faith.
C. Honoring the First Amendment: Suggested Guidelines for Future
Decisions
Trial courts should be required to rest their determinations on evi-
dence of harm rather than on mere speculation of harm to the child of
a Jehovah's Witness parent.2 4 Furthermore, "[c]ourts should not rule
on the comparative merits of particular religions."' 2 A parent should
not be denied physical custody simply because he or she holds relig-
ious beliefs in opposition to the other parent or to the American main-
stream. 26 Accordingly, "a judgement supported only by the tenuous
threads of a possible neuroses derived from deviation in normal activi-
ties [should not and] will not withstand the thrust of constitutional
guarantees. 127 Harm to the child from conflicting religious instruc-
tions or practices should not simply be assumed or surmised-it must




123. Id. at 76.
124. Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Mass. 1981).
125. See In re Deierling, 421 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); see also In re Marriage
of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985); Sanborn v. Sanborn, 465 A.2d 888, 893 (N.H.
1983); Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978).
126. See also Johnson, 564 P.2d at 76; Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Wis. 1984).
127. Smith v. Smith, 367 P.2d 230, 233 (Ariz. 1961).
128. See Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 607, 610 (mother's testimony deemed deficient by the court
because there was a "failure of proof about [the child's) physical and emotional condition or
about any causal connections between her visits with her father and that condition, such as it
may have been"); see also In re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Wash. 1980), rev.
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If a trial court refuses to follow the general rule dictating noninter-
ference with religious beliefs in child custody cases absent an affirma-
tive showing of compelling reasons for such action, it should be
viewed as "tantamount to a manifest abuse of discretion." 29 Further-
more, "[a]ny suggestion that a state judicial officer [was] favoring or
tending to favor one religious persuasion over another in a child cus-
tody dispute [should] be intolerable to our organic law. Judges should
not even give the appearance of such preference or favor." 10 Addi-
tionally, beliefs regarding the celebration of birthdays or Christmas,
or relating to military service or to the democratic process, are not
within the ambit of religious views that may be reasonably construed
as endangering the child's mental or physical health.' The nebulous,
vague, and indeterminate theory of "the child's best interests" should
not serve as a subterfuge for judges to exercise their personal religious
preferences. Some commentators have stated that the "best interests
of the child" doctrine has become "a phrase ready-made to justify the
court's delving into virtually any area of the parents' lives, and to sup-
port any conclusion it finally draws." 3 2
Undeniably, the need to find a suitable home for a child whose life
has been thrown into turmoil by a divorce constitutes a compelling
state interest that provides ample justification for applying the United
States Supreme Court's standards for evaluating a parent's religious
beliefs in the overall context of a custody proceeding. However, once
a suitable home is found, courts must be required to employ a sepa-
rate and more stringent analysis to justify any further infringement
upon the custodial parent's free exercise rights and his or her right to
raise the child in a particular faith.
V. CONCLUSION
The judiciary should tread lightly when evaluating and intruding
upon an individual's religious beliefs.' 3 3 Although courts must neces-
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1009 (1981)(finding that "a requirement of a reasonable and substantial
likelihood of immediate or future impairment best accommodates the general welfare of the
child and the free exercise of religion by the parents"); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Neb. 1990)(per curiam)(father became a Jehovah's Witness shortly before he separated from his
wife, a Catholic. At trial, a clinical psychologist testified that the conflicts between the two
religions contributed to the stress felt and manifested by the child); Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d
139, 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)(upholding a visitation restriction where a clinical psychologist
testified that "the inconsistent teachings would probably result in some mental disorientation"
to the child).
129. Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971).
130. Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 333 (Mo. 1978).
131. Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 439 (Ala.
1977).
132. Cathy M. Badal, Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitu-
tional Rights of Parents, 81 DICK. L. REv. 733, 735 (1977).
133. Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 137 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1958).
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sarily examine the religious nature of certain beliefs and actions when
presented with a free exercise claim, such as in the context of compel-
ling medical treatment or awarding child custody, they must not eval-
uate the correctness of either the belief or the religion that holds the
belief. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "con-
trolling a person's private thoughts" is beyond a court's authority.1 4
Accordingly, individuals have the right to be free of governmental in-
trusion into their minds, as "[ojur whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds." 3S In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division,136 the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice .. .is
not to turn upon a judicial perception of the ... particular belief or
practice in question ..... ,'7 As such, "religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection."'3
Freedom of religion is one of the most sacred American constitu-
tional protections. As Justice Jackson once noted, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein."' 3 9 The faith of Jehovah's Witnesses
should be recognized as one such star in this diverse constellation.
134. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
135. Id. at 565.
136. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
137. Id. at 714.
138. Id.
139. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
